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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A jury found Kent Glen Williams guilty of two bank robberies, use of a firearm in
the commission of one of the robberies, and unlawful possession of a firearm.
Mr. Williams raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion to sever the bank robbery charges due to the joinder’s
prejudicial effect. Second, he contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing
argument, which amounted to fundamental error. In light of these errors, Mr. Williams
respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction and
remand this case for further proceedings.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In September of 2015, the grand jury returned a true bill indicting Mr. Williams on
one count of robbery, in violation of I.C. § 18-6501. (R., pp.32–33.) Mr. Williams
allegedly robbed a Key Bank on April 14, 2015. (R., p.32.) The same day, the grand jury
returned another true bill with an Amended Indictment, charging Mr. Williams with three
additional offenses for unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of I.C. § 18-3316,
possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
(R., pp.35–36.) Mr. Williams entered a plea of not guilty, and the district court set the
trial for late February of 2016. (R., p.49.) The State later filed an Information Part II
alleging Mr. Williams was a persistent violator of the law under I.C. § 19-2514 due to
2
two prior felony convictions. (R., pp.62–63; Tr. Vol. I,1 p.1, L.1–p.8, L.15 (arraignment
on persistent violator).)
Then, almost four months after the Amended Indictment and about a month and
one-half before trial, the grand jury returned a Second Amended Indictment. (R., pp.87–
88.) In this indictment, Mr. Williams was charged with the April bank robbery (Count 1)
and unlawful possession of a firearm (Count 2), plus two new offenses for a second
robbery of a Key Bank on July 22, 2015 (Count 3), and the use of a handgun during the
commission of the July robbery (Count 4), in violation of I.C. § 19-2520. (R., pp.87–88.)
Mr. Williams then filed a motion for relief from prejudicial joinder.2 (R., pp.122–
29.) He asserted Counts 1 and 2 should be severed from Counts 3 and 4 and later that
only Count 1 should be severed from Counts 2, 3, and 4. (R., pp.122, 129; Tr. Vol. I,
p.46, Ls.3–6.) Among other arguments, Mr. Williams argued trying the two robbery
charges together would unfairly prejudice him because the jury would find him guilty of
the July robbery based on criminal propensity. (R., pp.125–29.) The district court held a
hearing on the motion, took the matter under advisement, and subsequently issued an
oral ruling. (See generally Tr. Vol. II; Tr. Vol. I, p.49, L.22–p.64, L.13). The district court
reasoned that evidence of one robbery would be admissible in the trial of the other as
evidence of identity and a common scheme or plan under Idaho Rule of Evidence
1 There are three transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains various
pre-trial hearings held on November 30, 2015, January 15, 2016, February 1, 2016, and
March 11, 2016, the jury trial held from March 28 to March 30, 2016, and post-trial
hearings held on May 6, 2016, and May 23, 2016. The second, cited as Volume II,
contains a hearing on Mr. Williams’s motion to sever, held on January 29, 2016. The
third, cited as Volume III, contains a hearing on Mr. Williams’s motion regarding
excessive restraints, held on February 5, 2016.
2 This was Mr. Williams’s second motion for relief from prejudicial joinder. His first
motion was withdrawn. (R., pp.75–78; Tr. Vol. I, p.9, Ls.17–22.)
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(“I.R.E.”) 404(b). (Tr. Vol. I, p.52, L.17–p.64, L.12.) The district court denied
Mr. Williams’s motion to sever the charges. (Tr. Vol. I, p.64, L.13.)
Mr. Williams proceeded to trial. (Tr. Vol. I, p.232, L.16–p.832, L.3.) Just prior to
trial, the parties stipulated to the filing of an Amended Information, which renumbered
the counts so the April robbery (Count 1), the July robbery (now Count 2), and the use
of a firearm in the commission of the July robbery (now Count 3) would be tried in Part 1
of the trial and the unlawful possession of the firearm (now Count 4) and the persistent
violator enhancement would be tried in Part 2. (R., pp.314–15; Tr. Vol. I, p.185, L.20–
p.204, L.20.) After Part 1 of the trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on Counts 1, 2,
and 3. (Tr. Vol. I, p.836, L.19–p.837, L.19; R., pp.372–73.) The district court
immediately proceeded to Part 2 of the trial. (Tr. Vol. I, p.837, L.20–p.868, L.7.) The jury
returned a guilty verdict on Count 4 as well as the persistent violator enhancement.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.869, L.8–p.871, L.16; R., p.374.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Williams to life imprisonment, with twelve years
fixed, for the April robbery, and life imprisonment, with twenty years fixed, for the July
robbery with the use of a firearm, to be served consecutively. (R., p.395; Tr. Vol. I,
p.913, Ls.1–13.) For unlawful possession of a firearm, the district court sentenced
Mr. Williams to five years fixed, to be served consecutive to the April robbery sentence
and concurrent with the July robbery sentence. (R., p.363; Tr. Vol. I, p.913, Ls.14–17.)
Thus, Mr. Williams’s aggregate sentence was life in prison, with thirty-two years fixed.
Mr. Williams filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction and Commitment. (R., pp.399–402.)
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ISSUES
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Williams’s motion for
relief from the prejudicial joinder of both bank robbery charges?
II. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by disparaging defense counsel and




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Williams’s Motion For
Relief From The Prejudicial Joinder Of Both Bank Robbery Charges
A. Introduction
Mr. Williams asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for relief from prejudicial joinder because the jury could have found Mr. Williams guilty of
the April robbery and then found him guilty of the July robbery based solely on criminal
disposition. If tried separately, the evidence of one robbery would not be admissible in
the trial of the other. Therefore, the district court should have granted Mr. Williams’s
motion and severed the two robbery charges to prevent any unfair prejudice.
B. Standard Of Review
The district court’s denial of a motion to sever is reviewed “under an abuse of
discretion standard.” State v. Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho 757, 760 (2015).
When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether
the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices
before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.
State v. Diaz, 158 Idaho 629, 634 (Ct. App. 2015).
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Severing The Joinder Of The
Two Bank Robbery Charges Because Evidence Of One Robbery Would Not Be
Admissible In The Trial Of The Other
Idaho Criminal Rule (“I.C.R.”) 8 permits the State to charge two or more offenses
in the same complaint, indictment, or information as separate counts if the offenses “are
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based on the same act or transaction or on two (2) or more acts or transactions
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.” I.C.R. 8. Even if
properly joined, “the defendant may obtain relief from the joinder . . . by showing that
joinder will result in unfair prejudice.” State v. Wilske, 158 Idaho 643, 644–45 (Ct. App.
2015).
I.C.R. 14 governs relief from prejudicial joinder. It states in relevant part:
If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or of defendants in a complaint, indictment or information or by
such joinder for trial together, the court may order the state to elect
between counts, grant separate trials of counts, grant a severance of
defendants, or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
I.C.R. 14. “An abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the denial of a
motion to sever joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 14, which presumes that joinder was proper in
the first place.”3 Diaz, 158 Idaho at 634 (citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564–65
(2007)). With respect to joinder, and it stands to reason with severance as well, its
propriety “is ‘determined by what is alleged, not what the proof eventually shows.’” Field,
144 Idaho at 565 (quoting State v. Cochran, 97 Idaho 71, 73 (1975)).
When reviewing the denial of a severance motion, “the inquiry on appeal is
whether the defendant has presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice resulted
from a joint trial.” State v. Blake, 161 Idaho 33, 35 (Ct. App. 2016). The Idaho appellate
courts have identified three potential sources of prejudice:
(1) the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence, and convict the
defendant of one or both crimes when it would not convict him of either if it
3 In district court, Mr. Williams moved for relief from the prejudicial joinder; he did not
argue the joinder itself was improper. (R., pp.122–29.) The district court, however,
discussed whether the initial joinder was proper in its oral ruling on Mr. Williams’s
motion. (Tr. Vol. I, p.52, L.12–p.59, L.11.) While not conceding the issue, Mr. Williams
limits his argument on appeal to the severance issue raised in his motion below.
7
could keep the evidence properly segregated; (2) the defendant may be
confounded in presenting defenses, as where he desires to assert his
privilege against self-incrimination with respect to one crime but not the
other; or (3) the jury may conclude that the defendant is guilty of one crime
and then find him guilty of the other because of his criminal disposition.
Wilske, 158 Idaho at 645 (quoting State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 867–68 (1983)). “The
defendant has the burden of showing such prejudice.” Blake, 161 Idaho at 35.
In this case, the third source of prejudice is at issue. As is the case here, “the
alleged prejudice is often that evidence of the defendant’s conduct which would be
admissible in the prosecution of one offense would not be admissible under [I.R.E.]
404(b) in the prosecution of the other offense if it were tried separately.” Orellana-
Castro, 158 Idaho at 760. The risk is that the jury will reach a guilty verdict on the basis
that the defendant “is a bad person.” Abel, 104 Idaho at 868. However, “showing that
evidence regarding one offense could not be admitted in a separate trial on the other
offense does not ipso facto establish that severance is required.” Wilske, 158 Idaho at
46. In some cases, “[e]ven if some part of the evidence of either of the incidents were
inadmissible in a separate trial,” the evidence for each offense may be “simple and
distinct,” and therefore severance is not required. Abel, 104 Idaho at 870. Thus, “the
ultimate question is whether the evidence of multiple offenses in a joint trial was unfairly
prejudicial to the defendant with respect to any of the individual charges.” Wilske, 158
Idaho at 645.
In reviewing the third source of prejudice, the Court “looks at the evidence of the
separate counts to determine whether, if the counts had been tried separately, the
separate evidence could have been admitted in the separate trials.” Diaz, 158 Idaho at
634. Under I.R.E. 404(b):
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Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident . . . .
I.R.E. 404(b). The prohibition on other crimes evidence “has its source in the common
law. The common law rule was that the doing of a criminal act, not part of the issue, is
not admissible as evidence of the doing of the criminal act charged.” State v. Grist, 147
Idaho 49, 52 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court applies to two-part standard when reviewing the district court’s
admission of other crimes evidence. State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 913 (2015). First,
“whether, under I.R.E. 404(b), the evidence is relevant as a matter of law to an issue
other than the defendant’s character or criminal propensity,” and second, “whether,
under I.R.E. 403, the district court abused its discretion in finding the probative value of
the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant.” Id. (quoting State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 8 (2013)). “Evidence is relevant if it
has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.’” State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2007) (quoting I.R.E. 401).
In this case, the evidence of one robbery would not be admissible pursuant to
I.R.E. 404(b) in the trial of the other. Other crimes evidence “should only be admitted if
‘relevant to prove . . . a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or
more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.’” State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho
678, 689 (2012) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 668
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(2010)); see also Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 762 (“a common scheme or plan must
embrace the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of
one tends to establish the other”). The Court has cautioned that “trial courts must
carefully scrutinize evidence offered as ‘corroboration’ or as demonstrating a ‘common
scheme or plan’ in order to avoid the erroneous introduction of evidence that is merely
probative of the defendant’s propensity to engage in criminal behavior.” Grist, 147 Idaho
at 53. Here, the evidence of the April and July robberies are not so related that the facts
of one establish Mr. Williams as the perpetrator of the other. As found by the district
court, the similarities between the two robberies were:  (1) the robberies occurred
approximately three months apart; (2) both banks were Boise branches of Key Bank;
and (3) both banks were robbed shortly after the bank opened. (Tr. Vol., p.54, Ls.16–19,
Ls.22–24; Tr. Vol. II, p.32, Ls.8–14.) The similarities between the perpetrators were:  (1)
both were identified as a white male between 5’8” and just over 6” tall; (2) both were
wearing a dark-billed cap with a long sleeve jacket; (3) both wore similar mirrored
aviator-style sunglasses; (4) both wore a handkerchief over the mouth and nose; (5) the
jacket and handkerchief in each robbery were color-coordinated; (6) both perpetrators,
appearing to have knowledge of the bank, demanded money from two teller drawers out
of view of bank customers; (7) both demanded 20s, 50s, and 100s; (8) both demanded
no dye, bait, or tracker bills; and (9) both quickly identified the tracker bill4 in each
robbery. (Tr. Vol. I, p.54, L.19–p.57, L.3; Tr. Vol. II, p.32, L.15–p.37, L.6, p.37, Ls.15–
21.) With regard to the handkerchief, it was easily pulled over the perpetrator’s face in
the April robbery, which indicated to the district court “some sort of binding system in the
4 A tracker bill feels thicker than a regular bill. (Tr. Vol. II, p.36, Ls.11–20.)
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back” to keep it together. (Tr. Vol. I, p.55, Ls.10–13; Tr. Vol. II, p.34, Ls.5–22.) In the
July robbery, one of the bank tellers observed a hand-sewn elastic band on the back of
the handkerchief. (Tr. Vol. I, p.55, Ls.13–17; Tr. Vol. II, p.34, Ls.5–22.) These facts,
taken as a whole, are not distinctive or remarkable. An early morning bank robbery
committed by an average white male with a disguise and some knowledge of teller
drawers and tracking bills is not so unusual that it tends to identify the individual of the
prior robbery. Rather, these facts are common components of bank robberies. See
State v. Sanchez, Nos. 43293, 43294, 2017 Opinion No. 16S, at pp.6–7 (Ct. App. Feb.
27, 2017) (holding the defendant’s opportunistic tendency to abuse young female
children in his care was “unfortunately entirely unremarkable in sexual abuse cases”
and did not show a common scheme or plan). Moreover, a key distinction between the
two robberies casts doubt on the commonalities—in the April robbery, the perpetrator
did not display a weapon; in the July robbery, the perpetrator showed the tellers a
handgun in his waistband. (Tr. Vol. I, p.56, Ls.12–14; Tr. Vol. II, p.36, L.24–p.37, L.3.)
This difference sets apart the two robberies. Thus, the evidence of one robbery was not
relevant to any enumerated purpose under I.R.E. 404(b) because the evidence fails to
show a common scheme or plan in order to establish identity.
Even if the evidence of one robbery was admissible in the trial of the other under
I.R.E. 404(b), the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any probative
value. See I.R.E. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”).
The prejudicial effect of [character evidence] is that it induces the jury to
believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial
because he is a man of criminal character. Character evidence, therefore,
takes the jury away from their primary consideration of the guilt or
11
innocence of the particular crime on trial. The drafters of I.R.E. 404(b)
were careful to guard against the admission of evidence that would unduly
prejudice the defendant, while still allowing the prosecution to present
probative evidence.
Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. First, when examining the prejudicial effect of the April robbery
evidence against the July robbery, it is critical to recognize that most of the evidence
identifying Mr. Williams as the perpetrator of the July robbery stemmed from the
evidence of the April robbery. In the April robbery, the police were able to identify the
getaway car and connect that car to Mr. Williams. (Tr. Vol. I, p.56, L.14–p.57, L.13;
Tr. Vol. II, p.38, Ls.3–22, p.39, Ls.5–11.) In the April robbery, the police observed a
bump on the perpetrator’s hand from the bank’s surveillance video and then observed a
similar bump on Mr. Williams’s hand. (Tr. Vol. I, p.57, L.14–21; Tr. Vol. II, p.38, L.23–
p.39, L.4.) No getaway car was observed in July robbery. No videos showed a bump on
the perpetrator’s hand in the July robbery. Unlike the getaway car or the hand marking,
there was nothing from the July robbery itself to identify Mr. Williams as the perpetrator.5
Thus, the identification of Mr. Williams as the perpetrator of the July robbery was
dependent on his identification as the perpetrator of the April robbery. Despite any
probative value in the April robbery to identify Mr. Williams, the “overwhelming effect” of
5 During the execution of a search warrant after the July robbery, the police found a
handgun in Mr. Williams’s motel room that the district court found was similar to the gun
used in the July robbery. (Tr. Vol. I, p.58, Ls.6–8.) This is the only independent evidence
to support an identification of Mr. Williams as the perpetrator of the July robbery. In
addition, the police found two other sets of matching long-sleeved shirts and
handkerchiefs, as well as sewing materials and aviator sunglasses. (Tr. Vol. I, p.57,
L.22–p.58, L.6, p.58, Ls.13–15; Tr. Vol. II, p.37, L.11–p.38, L.2.) The police also found
$7,000 in one hundred dollar bills, some of them sequential, but none were recorded,
tracker, or bait bills. (Tr. Vol. I, p.58, Ls.8–13; Tr. Vol. II, p.37, Ls.7–10.) These items,
however, are not more attributable to one robbery than the other. These items do not
affirmatively show that Mr. Williams committed both robberies.
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the evidence would have emphasized Mr. Williams’s propensity to rob banks and thus
induce the jury to find Mr. Williams’s guilty of the July robbery. Sanchez, 2017 Opinion
No. 16S, at p.9. Put another way, lacking identification evidence from the July robbery
itself, there was a substantial risk the jury would find Mr. Williams robbed the bank in
July because he did it a few months earlier in April. Grist, 147 Idaho at 54.
Second, looking at prejudicial effect of the July robbery evidence against the April
robbery, the probative value of the July robbery evidence to show Mr. Williams
committed April robbery is minimal to nonexistent. Again, the July robbery itself offered
no independent identification evidence. As such, the evidence of the July robbery in the
trial of the April robbery amounts to pure propensity evidence—because Mr. Williams
committed a bank robbery in July, he must have committed one a few months earlier.
Any probative value in the July robbery evidence is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. The prejudicial effect of the July robbery is further magnified
by the use of a firearm in the July robbery. The prejudice to Mr. Williams from the jury
learning he has not only a criminal propensity to commit bank robberies, but also a
disposition to use a gun is self-evident.
In summary, the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Williams’s
motion to sever the robbery charges by failing to act consistently with the legal
standards and failing to reach its decision by an exercise of reason. As a matter of law,
the evidence of one robbery was not admissible in the trial of the other, and therefore
the district court did not apply the correct legal standards in ruling otherwise. Further, for
either robbery charge, any probative value in the evidence of one robbery in the trial of
the other is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and thus the
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district court did not exercise reason in its weighing decision. Finally, the State cannot
meet its burden to show that the district court’s failure to sever the robbery charges was
harmless. See Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 762–63; Sanchez, 2017 Opinion No. 16S,
at pp.6–10. Because the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Williams’s
motion for relief from prejudicial joinder, this Court should vacate his judgement of
conviction, reverse the district court’s order denying severance, and remand this case
for new, separate trials on each robbery charge.
II.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Disparaging Defense Counsel And Vouching
For The Police During Closing Arguments
A. Introduction
In the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor disparaged defense
counsel by describing his opening statement as containing ludicrous allegations that
were offensive to him and the police. The prosecutor also informed the jury that the
police did “good police work” and “a fine job” and the police’s testimony was the truth.
Mr. Williams contends the prosecutor’s statements were improper and thus deprived
him of his right to fair trial.
B. Standard Of Review
If the prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to at trial, the Court applies the
fundamental error standard:
Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears
the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged error: (1)
violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2)
plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not
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contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the
failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227–28 (2010). To show the error was not harmless, the
defendant must prove “there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the
outcome of the trial.” Id. at 226.
C. The Prosecutor’s Comments Disparaging Defense Counsel And Vouching For
The Police Amounted To Fundamental Error
“‘Every person accused of [a] crime in Idaho has the right to a fair and impartial
trial,’ State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 504 (1980), ‘whether guilty or innocent,’ State v.
Fowler, 13 Idaho 317, 325 (1907).” State v. Skunkcap, 157 Idaho 221, 234 (2014). This
Court “long ago held, ‘It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair
trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the jury.’” Id. (quoting
State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 44 (1903)). “Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict
on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence
admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.” Perry,
150 Idaho at 227. “To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct
must result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State v. Jimenez, 159
Idaho 466, 472 (Ct. App. 2015).
“Closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the
trier of fact in a criminal case.” State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 868 (2014) (quoting
State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 133 (Ct. App. 2013)).
Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing
argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective
standpoints the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom.”
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State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003). “Considerable latitude,
however, has its limits, both in matters expressly stated and those
implied.” State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007).
Moses, 156 Idaho at 868. Whether the prosecutor’s closing argument exceeds those
limits and “rise[s] to the level of fundamental error is a question that must be analyzed in
the context of the trial as a whole.” State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718 (2011). “The
relevant question is whether the prosecutors’ comments ‘so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Id. at 718–19
(quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)).
“It is well established that a prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she uses
inflammatory tactics to appeal to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury.” State v.
Contreras-Gonzales, 146 Idaho 41, 48 (Ct. App. 2008).
A prosecuting attorney may express an opinion in argument as to the truth
or falsity of testimony or the guilt of the defendant when such opinion is
based upon the evidence, but the prosecutor should exercise caution to
avoid interjecting his or her personal belief and should explicitly state that
the opinion is based solely on inferences from evidence presented at trial.
State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 19 (Ct. App. 2008). Thus, it is misconduct for the
prosecutor to express personal opinions and beliefs about the credibility of a witness.
State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 369 (Ct. App. 2010). “A prosecutor can improperly
vouch for a witness by placing the prestige of the state behind the witness or referring to
information not given to the jury that supports the witness.” Id. at 368. “Likewise, it is
misconduct for the prosecution to make personal attacks on defense counsel in closing
argument.” Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280 (citing State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 223
(2000); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 9 & n.7 (1985)).
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In this case, Mr. Williams contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during
closing argument by disparaging defense counsel, interjecting personal beliefs, and
personally vouching for the police’s credibility. Mr. Williams did not object to the
misconduct at trial, so he must show fundamental error on appeal. In light of the
prejudicial and inflammatory nature of the prosecutor’s remarks, Mr. Williams has met
this standard.
First, the prosecutor’s statements rise to the level of misconduct and thus
violated Mr. William’s unwaived constitutional right to a fair trial. During rebuttal closing
argument, the prosecutor read to the jury the instruction that informs them arguments
and statements by lawyers are not evidence. (Tr. Vol. I, p.814, L.19–p.815, L.19; see
also R., p.347 (Instruction No. 11).) The prosecutor then argued:
And, so, frankly, I’m telling you is [sic] you’re not to rely upon even
what I’m saying to you. This is argument, this is to help you understand
what the evidence means. So when you hear in opening – the only
reasoning [sic] I bring this up is because it’s true that defense counsel in
opening statement made some allegations, frankly, it rose to the level, in
my view, of allegations, and I have to address them, I think, because the
evidence does not support the allegation that was made. And I am
speaking specifically about the allegation that  –  again,  I’ll  call  it  the
allegation – that this evidence, the gun was planted in his hotel room. You
recall that.6
Well, we were very careful, we asked all the witnesses could this
happen? No. Did it happen, did you do that? No.
6 Notably, defense counsel did not make this “allegation” in his opening statement or
closing argument. Rather, defense counsel stated in his opening statement that
Mr. Williams would testify and tell the jury “adamantly, without a doubt, he does not
possess a firearm, ammunition, holster, clips or anything associated with these guns.”
(Tr. Vol. I, p.383, Ls.17–19.) This is simply a general statement that Mr. Williams would
deny possession, which is far different than a statement that the police planted the gun
in Mr. Williams’s motel room. In closing argument, defense counsel made absolutely no
comments about the police planting the gun. In fact, defense counsel made the opposite
comment that Mr. Williams had a gun in his possession. (Tr. Vol. I, p.806, Ls.23–25.)
17
(Tr. Vol. I, p.815, L.20–p.816, L.10.) The prosecutor went on to characterize defense
counsel’s “allegation” as “ludicrous” and “offensive” to him and the police:
Now, ladies and gentlemen, that didn’t happen, the firearm was not
planted in the defendant’s hotel room. And the allegation – you know, I
say it rises to the level of an allegation – that somehow the defendant
simply fits the profile of the right kind of guy that you can pin this on, well,
that is ludicrous, and I’ll tell you why. . . .
I’ll tell you what else is ludicrous, because there’s tons of evidence,
and my partner went through all that evidence that shows you Mr. Williams
was the robber of those two banks. If the police were going to go and pin
something on some guy, just pick him out of random because he happens
to be – he could potentially be the kind of guy we see on the surveillance
videos, white male, roughly that build, yeah, let’s pick him because he
happens to be in a cheap motel.7
First of all, that’s offensive to me, to law enforcement. But think
about what that means. . . . The truth is that’s not what happened ladies
and gentlemen. What happened is exactly what they testified to. These
things were legitimately found in the defendant’s possession. And so  I
apologize, and I’m a little bit amped up about that, but it’s because it’s
offensive to me about law enforcement, that the implication be raised that,
hey, it’s on them.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.816, L.16–p.818, L.8.) Immediately after describing himself as “amped up”
and offended by defense counsel, the prosecutor told the jury: “This is a case of good
police work. The police did a fine job here. And in fact, because of their good police
work we were able to solve this case.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.818, Ls.9–11.)
Taken individually or as a whole, the prosecutor’s statements were improper,
thus depriving Mr. Williams of his right to fair trial. First, the prosecutor disparaged
7 Defense counsel said in his opening statement, “Kent is the type of person that it’s
very easy to pin these things on,” and he explained that Mr. Williams is homeless, has
all his possessions and money in his car, and travels around the Northwest from one
cheap motel to another. (Tr. Vol. I, p.380, Ls.17–22.) Defense counsel also argued that
the police were operating on an assumption that the perpetrator of the April robbery and
July robbery were the same individual. (Tr. Vol. I, p.380, L.3–p.382, L.23.) Defense
counsel made similar remarks in closing, explaining that the police assumed the two
robberies were committed by the same individual and “then later trying to pin them on
Kent Williams.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.802, L.17–p.803, L.7.)
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defense counsel by labeling his opening and closing remarks as ludicrous allegations.
Second, the prosecutor interjected his personal beliefs by informing the jury that he was
offended—personally and on law enforcement’s behalf—by defense counsel’s actions in
defending his client. Indeed, the prosecutor was so “amped up” that he felt the need to
apologize to the jury. Third, the prosecutor vouched for the police’s credibility by telling
the jury that the “truth” was “exactly” what was said by the police. Finally, the prosecutor
further vouched for the police, placing the State’s prestige behind them, by telling the
jury that this case was an example of “good police work,” “a fine job,” and, again, “good
police work,” which allowed them to solve the case. These statements were calculated
to inflame the juror’s minds and arouse prejudice or passion against the defendant.
“[A]ppeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory
tactics are impermissible.” State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 146 (2014) (quoting State v.
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 62 (2011)). In light of the inflammatory, prejudicial statements
by the prosecutor, Mr. Williams has shown a violation of his unwaived constitutional
right to a fair trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
Second, the error is clear and plain from the record. It is well-established that a
prosecutor cannot disparage defense counsel, interject personal beliefs, or vouch for
credibility. See, e.g., Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280; Gross, 146 Idaho at 19; Contreras-
Gonzales, 146 Idaho at 48. There is no plausible strategic or tactical reason why
defense counsel would chose not to object to the prosecutor’s argument. The
prosecutor’s argument informed the jury that any defense was a ludicrous allegation, so
offensive to the State and the police, that the prosecutor could not help but comment on
it. This argument’s purpose was to inflame the jurors’ minds and appeal to their
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emotion, passion, and prejudice. Mr. Williams asserts he has met his burden to show
the error plainly exists.
Finally, this error was not harmless. By using inflammatory tactics to appeal to
the jury’s passion and prejudice, the prosecutor attempted to secure a verdict on factors
other than the law and the evidence admitted a trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. The
evidence Mr. Williams committed the two robberies was circumstantial and, further, a
finding Mr. Williams committed the July robbery relied heavily on a finding the
Mr. Williams committed the April robbery. These tactics by the prosecutor encouraged
the jury to set aside any doubt as whether Mr. Williams committed one robbery but not
the other and to consider the State’s and police’s version of events to be true.
Mr. Williams submits he has met his burden to show there is a reasonable possibility the
prosecutorial misconduct affected the outcome of trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
CONCLUSION
Due to the prejudicial joinder, Mr. Williams respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his judgement of conviction, vacate the district court’s order denying severance,
and remand this case to the district court with instructions to sever the charges for
separate trials. Alternatively, due to the prosecutorial misconduct, Mr. Williams
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand this
case for a new trial.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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